Roman Șarov

1. Introduction

The Eurosceptic phenomenon has profoundly dominated the European political landscape and its discourse over the past several years accelerating its uprising popularity with two major events: the immigration crisis (2015) and the Brexit Referendum (2016). From then on, the shift in European politics changed systematically in favor of the dynamic, radical, right and left-wing oriented Eurosceptic movements across the European Union. To begin with, should Taggart’s definition of Euroscepticism be considered: “Euroscepticism expresses the idea of a contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.”¹ Unquestionably, this perception has been at the core of the latest political turbulences in the European Union and had some sort of an impact in almost every Western EU country, as the extent to which Eurosceptic parties enter local and national Parliament’s growths exponentially with every election cycle. However, is this trend not being manifested in every country, as the results of the spring edition of the Eurobarometer² carried out in all EU member states highlights, more than half (52%) of Romanians have greater trust in the EU compared to their national institutions. This is one of the highest levels out of all member states. The EU average on this indicator stands at 42%. This positive indicator can be explained as Romania has considerably benefited from EU guidance in reforming the judicial system, democratizing state institutions and profited from macro-financial assistance since its adhesion. On the contrary, is the public image in other Eastern European member states vis-à-vis the functioning of the EU, as in Hungary for instance described by distrust and a highly negative attitude (50%).

Given these considerations, will the thesis analyze the following question: how is the uprising Eurosceptic phenomenon in Europe being manifested in Romania? Firstly, will the general development of the Eurosceptic movement in two other member states (Poland and Hungary) from 2015 onwards be analyzed. In this sense, will cross-country linkages and differences be further explored, in order to attain a profound understanding of the issue domestically in Romania. The next section will emphasize in more detail the fundamental hypothesis of the thesis: the impact of Euroscepticism and Europhoria and its tendencies in Romania in the post-adhesion phase.

• Taggart, Paul. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems.” European Journal of Political Research 33, no. 3 (1998): 366.
• European Commission. “The Views of Europeans on the European Union’s Priorities Report.” Standard Eurobarometer 89, Brussels, (2018).

In the concluding section of the analysis will the protest from 2017-2018, as a potential trigger for profound Eurosceptic and populist movements be examined.

2. Evolvement of the Eurosceptic phenomenon in Poland, Hungary & Romania

Before examining the research question regarding the Status Quo of Euroscepticism in Romania a closer look should be taken at two member states struggling with Eurosceptic movements; via a comparative system analysis will the cases of Poland, Hungary and Romania be compared. All three examined countries are former Soviet Union satellites, democracies that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and current EU member states. In Poland and Hungary, the dynamics of party competition show an increase of Euroscepticism in relation to the economic consequences of EU integration.

Especially in Poland, appears the political landscape more complex, where the economic dimension of Euroscepticism does not produce bipolar competition between pro-European social democrats and Eurosceptic liberal-conservatives. The right-wing parties in Poland, which won all the seats at the general election in 2015, are divided into Eurosceptic and pro-European. Hungary however, is perceived in a marked contrast to a supranational institution such as the European Union, as the consolidation of the Hungarian national identity and state sovereignty intensifies with the spread of conservative (FIDESZ³) and/or xenophobic (JOBBIK⁴). In contrast to Poland is the pro/anti-EU cleavage consolidated within the sphere of the left/right division and is not separated within political parties.⁵ Romania on the opposite side constitutes a different scenario, in that none of the moderate right-wing parties have adopted a Eurosceptic stance and do not appear to have given way to compete for and against the EU. Attributable to the major parties of the right and the left are seeking further legitimization at the internal and international levels through support for European values, while it is the more extremist parties that have opted for opposition and even these of less radical (PRM) nature.

• Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union is the governing nationalist party, since its return to power in 2010 the party has frequently faced criticism from, and been involved in conflict with, EU institutions and other international organizations regarding the government’s controversial economic policies, institutional reforms and political practices, recent controversy centered on asylum policy.
• Hungary’s main right-wing opposition party and second strongest political force, promotes an end to immigration, stemming emigration of Hungarian youth to the wealthier west of the EU, a tough line on Hungary’sRoma minority. Additional information: “Political Structure.” Country Report: Hungary, 2017, Country Report: Hungary, (2017).
• Pisciotta, Barbara. “The Center-Periphery Cleavage Revisited: East and Central Europe from Postcommunism to Euroscepticism”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 22:2, (2016): 193-219.

Furthermore, is the general skepticism on the part of citizens oriented to the ability of national institutions to cope with emergencies, not least because they have requested direct intervention on the part of the European Commission.⁶ To conclude, should the data of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 2014⁷ vis-à-vis Euroscepticism in the East and Central European party systems be taken into consideration. The analysis accounts to the last elections in the three countries and evaluates the combined results of soft and hard Eurosceptic parties- Hungary: 65.1% Poland: 42.6% and Romania: 1.2%. This divergence highlights the dissimilarities between the countries and the creation of the dichotomy of Eurosceptic (Hungary and Poland) vs. Europhilia (Romania) EU member states.

3 Euroscepticism in Romania. Reality or Imminent Dilemma?

The following chapter aims at exploring the Eurosceptic phenomenon at the domestic level in Romania and takes the research question into closer examination. Research on Euroscepticism at the EU level comprises little if no data on Eurosceptic attitudes in Romania. In this regard, will two central elements be analyzed: the state of the art on the national political discourse concerning Euroscepticism from 2007 onwards and the establishment and development of radical left/right-wing parties in the national political spectrum post-Brexit. To begin with, should be stressed out that ever since its adhesion to the EU remains Romania among the most euro-enthusiast countries of the European Union, scoring much above the average level of trust of the European citizens. Following the accentuated descending trend during the European debt crisis, has Romania gained momentum after 2013, the levels of trust at the beginning of 2015 being the highest since its integration in the European Union.⁸

However, should the positive approach towards the EU be hereby interlinked with a high level of distrust in the national authorities. Inasmuch as there has been a post-accession downturn in Euroenthusiasm in Romania, attributable to the loss of potency of the symbolic appeal of the EU and disappointed economic expectations.⁹ In addition decreased attachment to the European frame is attributable to the perception of a reduction in the efficiency of the political institutions in Romania in the aftermath of membership.¹⁰

• This happened, for example, in Romania during the institutional crisis of 2012 and has influenced support for the more pro-European parties.
• Chapel Hill Expert Survey,” Version 2015.1 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) (2014).
• Radu, Loredana. “Unconditional Trust? Public Opinion towards the EU in Romania.” Journal of Media Research – Revista De Studii Media IX, no. 1 (24), (2016): 60-79.
• Racovita, Mihaela. “Europeanization and Effective Democracy in Romania and Bulgaria.” Romanian Journal of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2011): 28-49.
• Turcanu, Florin. “National and Right-wing Radicalism in the New Democracies: Romania” (2011): 2.

The impact of the Eurosceptic phenomenon has therefore been restrictive in the case of Romania from 2007 onwards, one of the significant motives, which will further be elaborated in the next chapter, is the determined financial assistance accorded by the European Union and channeled through the five European structural and investment funds (ESIF). Furthermore, with the creation of a separate Ministry for attracting more European grants (Ministry of European Funds) has the desire for more European integration and intensified economic cooperation been institutionalized.

The political system in Romania had no major uprising of extreme left/right-wing political identities during the post-accession timeframe. This can be traced back to the above mentioned and as the trust in the functioning of the EU is of highly positive nature, had no major European crisis a deep-rooted impact on the country’s internal political vector. For mainstream parties to potentially grow more Eurosceptic, two conditions must be met: a) voters have to become more opposed to European integration – a trend that has been identifiable in 2007– 2008, and b) media to regard the issue with greater salience.¹¹ Nevertheless, are both circumstances unlikely as theirs no direct substitute to the European integration path and the media does not treat the issue entirely, as the post-accession period did not feature any thorough debates focusing on the merits of the decision to join the European Union, with almost unconditional support offered by civil society and the elites.¹²

The national political spectrum is nowadays looking for a new dynamism that feeds on the social and political tensions and ruptures that have marked Romania over the past decade, while also taking advantage of its recently gained quality as an EU member.¹³ The only radical left-wing political force that could build on that, as well as the best-known Romanian nationalist party from the post-communist period is the PRM – Partidul Romania Mare (Greater Romania Party). The party was formed in 1991 and combines a strongly nationalist orientation with a retooling of the ideological elements and propagandistic themes from the Ceausescu era.¹⁴ Anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism, offensive use of language, rich in slang and grotesque images, directed at enemies has become, from the very beginning, a distinct feature of the PRM populist discourse. The last comeback of the PRM can be attributed mainly to the social effects of the economic crisis in 2009.

• Roth, F., Nowak-Lehmann, F., Otter, T. “Crisis and Trust in National and European Union Institutions—Panel Evidence for the EU, 1999–2012.” RSCAS Working Papers. Florence: European University Institute, (2013).
• Buturoiu, Raluca. “Euroscepticism – a Today’s Issue with Tomorrow Consequences.” Romanian Journal of Communications and Public Relations 16, no. 1 (2016): 41-52
• Gómez-Reino, Margarita. “Nationalisms in the European Arena.” Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Cham: Springer International Publishing, (2018).
• Turcanu, Florin. “National and Right-wing Radicalism in the New Democracies: Romania” (2011): 2.

PRM received 8,65% of the votes on June 7, 2009, managing to send three representatives to the Parliament in Strasbourg (196-198). Vis-à-vis the right-wing parties is the number of members making up the extreme right-wing groups difficult to determine – it has generally remained quite small as this is reflected in the very poor results – considerably under 1% of the votes – obtained by those parties (MPR, PPP and PDN)¹⁵ that took part, in the 1990s, in the local or parliamentary elections.¹⁶

4. Economical EUphoria in Romania

The following chapter will analyze one of the key elements, wherefore Euroscepticism has not succeeded to develop intensely in Romania since adhesion to the European Union: economic assistance and prosperity provided by the EU and will make usage of the theoretical background offered by S. Guerra¹⁷. The quantitative analysis shows there were common characteristics and differences in the two regions (East and West): the cost/benefit ratio, named as a utilitarian model is most explanatory in the case of the Eastern European member states, while identity and political cues are the most significant factors across the Western member states. Therefore, can thru the utilitarian model the phenomenon be better explained and as the Standard Eurobarometer 85 released in spring 2016 points out. In which the Romanians asked about life in the European Union showed that the most important issues facing Romania at the moment are: unemployment, immigration, economic situation, health, and social security. For this reason 78% of subjects responded that the current situation in the national economy is “totally bad” and 38% of Romanians responded that they do not feel European citizens.¹⁸ This underlines that the popularity of the EU in Romania is directly correlated with the economic assistance offered by the EU and that the economic framework is linked to future perspectives of either Euroscepticism or Europhilia.

Purely from an economical standpoint is Romania, with year on year GDP growth at 8.8%, currently the fastest growing economy in the EU. For instance, only via the European Cohesion Policy during 2007-2013 has Romania been allocated almost 20 billion euros under the Convergence Objective and €455 million under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective.¹⁹ These investments are made in order to improve basic transport infrastructure and accessibility,

• Shafir, Michael. “The Mind of Romania’s Radical Right” in Sabrina P. RAMET (ed.), The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, The Pennsylvania State University, (1999): 213-214
• Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Radical Politics in East-Central Europe (IX): the Romanian Radical Return”

East-European Perspectives, (2001).

• Guerra, Simona. “Eurosceptic Voices: Beyond Party Systems, Across Civil Society.” (2017).
• Vătăman, Dan. “Ten years after Romania’s accession to the European Union: costs, benefits and perspectives.” Challenges of the Knowledge Society, (2017): 599-603.
• European Commission. “European Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 in Romania: Priorities and Impact of Cohesion Policy in the Member States”, (2009

research and innovation to ensure long-term sustainable economic competitiveness and business support, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The European structural funds are a driver of economic development and are designed to reduce the regional disparities and social inequalities within the EU, to promote social cohesion and sustainable economic development within the EU member states. Another problem occurring in the process of economic development in Romania is corruption, as this issue is growing endemic and systematic on a long-term basis, are the income and wealth distribution negatively affected. According to the corruption perception index (CPI)²⁰, experienced Romania a low index during the entire transition, being therefore placed in the top three EU countries with the highest corruption norm. In 2009, Romania attained the highest CPI (3.8) in the EU.

Due to the slow progress done in combating corruption does the European Union continuously monitor problems like justice and corruption in Romania, although the status as EU members from 2007 would not request this surveillance.²¹ Although, the European structural funds represent the most important factor for stimulating the economic development in Romania, especially the regional development, have high indexes of corruption and inefficient bureaucracy obstructed in the last years the efficient absorption of EU funds, this could bring about additional legitimacy to set off Eurosceptic movements. For the reason that the state apparatus is unproductive in implementing the necessary EU guidelines and norms for a genuine top-down development. Moreover, is the economic factor essential in order to maintain a positive image of the European Union and safekeeping for Euroscepticism to remain unestablished. Subsequently, can be deducted that the Romanian government is acting as a utilitarian state, as long as the cost/benefit ratio befits the state’s interests, the government, mainstream parties and lastly the population will maintain a strong pro-European path. Nonetheless, as experienced before, with the European debt crisis could a large-scale crisis or even national obstructions occur, as corruption set a Eurosceptic wave in motion. The involvement of the European Union remains of upmost priority for keeping Eurosceptic activities at a minimum in Romania, economic assistance is particularly vital for consolidating a stronger membership.

• Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index CPI” (2009).
• Szeles, Monica Răileanu. “What Lies beyond the Romania’s Economic.” University of Brasov, Broad Research in Accounting, Negotiation, and Distribution, Volume 3, Issue 3, (2012).

4. National protests as a trigger for profounder Euroscepticism?

As empirically demonstrated throughout the thesis is the Status Quo in Romania concerning Euroscepticism, especially in comparison to other EU member states (Poland, Hungary) largely regarded as Euroenthusiastic and even consolidates a more dynamic membership of the country within the EU, both politically and economically.²² In the following chapter however, will a potential trigger for the emergence of fresh populist and Eurosceptic movements be evaluated: the antigovernment street protests from 2017-2018. Starting with February 2017, when a half-million people took to the streets to oppose an emergency decree that effectively decriminalized low-level corruption. Since then, has the Social Democrat-led government continued to push through legislation that critics believe will undo anticorruption steps taken after Romania joined the European Union in 2007. Chief among their grievances are legislative changes that many say will weaken the rule of law.²³ The failure of the political class, to align actions with the values of the EU, has serious economic and social consequences for the country.²⁴

A clear sign of the lack of confidence in the future amongst young Romanians is the scale of emigration. Of major concern is the exodus: more than 3.4 million of the country’s twenty-two million citizens left Romania between 2007 and 2017, some 17% of the population, the second greatest number of emigrants after Syria, and this from a country not torn by war.²⁵ The inability of the State to deal with the exodus, to implement the EU acquis²⁶ and to guarantee the functioning of the rule of law could, therefore, be foundations for the commencement of Eurosceptic movements to emerge from both left, right, and oppose the ruling regime. The unceasing downfall in trust in the national institutions could additionally have a spillover effect on the EU in the long-term, as theirs no sufficient implication in the domestic decision-making process. In addition, Romania’s Role in the EU will be specially monitored, as the country is preparing to assume the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019.

• Tătar, Marius Ioan. “Democratization and Political Alienation: The Legacies of Post-Communist Transition in ” Journal of Identity and Migration Studies 10, no. 2 (2016): 85-108

• Kit, Gillet. “Violence Erupts as Tens of Thousands Protest Corruption in Romania”, The New York Times, (2018).

• Braşoveanu, Florica; Alexandru, Petru; Lisievici, Brezeanu. “The relationship between the Romanian and the European citenzenship.” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice IV, no. 2, (2012): 533-36.
• Deletant, Dennis. “Romania’s protests and the PSD: Understanding the deep malaise that now exists in Romanian society”, (2018).
• The EU’s ‘acquis’ is the body of common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries, as EU Members; additional information can be found at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/acquis.html https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/acquis.html:

“A bad presidency” could be an initial starting point for the Eurosceptic phenomenon to profoundly establish itself in Romania. The positioning and interference of the EU in preserving a peaceful and pro-European political climate is therefore vital, as the German Pegida²⁷ movement and the establishment of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has shown, is the threat of street movements enhancing the popularity of Eurosceptic, Nationalist and Populist parties at an all-time high.²⁸ In retrospective has the rise in popularity of the PMR in 2009, during the European debt crisis emphasized, that the political spectrum in Romania is vulnerable for radical parties to prosper especially during a larger crisis. Therefore, is the (re)appearance of left/right-wing Eurosceptic movements succeeding the latest street protests imaginable, if particularly the European Union will have a too soft handling and won’t pressure the national authorities to actively fight corruption and create a suitable climate for the rule of law.

The upcoming timeframe will be crucial for the manifestation of the phenomenon in Romania, as the street protests have not brought the desired political change in the society, are further violent outbursts of anger and disappointment highly likely. However, another specific element for the Romanian political spectrum in the post-adhesion timeframe is that the key challenges as combating corruption, selective justice, and poverty are all domestic problems. They’re not interlinked with external factors that could have a lasting impact on the perception of the European Union in Romania, this has also been vital for Eurosceptic tendency’s to not further develop post-2007. In this sense has President Iohannis stated: We hear lately in Romania voices that easily blame Europe and Brussels for almost anything. Some politicians questioning the role and relevance of the European Union use the Eurosceptic discourse constantly. Without democracy, rule of law, without proper laws, there is no prosperity and well-being for most citizens. There are only privileges for a small group of people in power. Our response must be determined and based on the indisputable advantages of belonging to the European Union.²⁹ This approach highlights once again the threat emanated by the discouragement in the national authorities and the prospect of destabilization of the political Status Quo and the appearance of more radical left and right-wing oriented Eurosceptic parties.

• Schmidt, Ina. “PEGIDA: A Hybrid Form of a Populist Right Movement.” German Politics and Society 35, no. 4 (2017): 105-17.
• Plehwe, Dieter; Schlögl, Matthias. “Europäische und Zivilgesellschaftliche Hintergründe der Euro(pa)skeptischen Partei Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD)(EN): European AndCivil Society Backgrounds: the Euro(pa)skeptical Alternative Party for Germany (AfD).” Revised Version ed. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Für Sozialforschung, (2014).
• Braşoveanu, Florica; Alexandru, Petru; Lisievici Brezeanu. “The relationship between the Romanian and the European citizenship.” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice IV, no. 2, (2012): 533-36.

6. Conclusion

The manifestation of the Eurosceptic phenomenon in Romania is interconnected with complex internal (absence of left/right-wing parties and high popularity of pro-European parties) and external (dependence on macro-financial assistance and political reforming by the EU institutions) elements. To make better sense of the issue in Romania and to elucidate the marked contrast of the Eurosceptic phenomenon have the movements in Poland and Hungary in the second chapter been compared. In Poland, for instance, are Eurosceptic tendency’s divided within the right-wing parties, which won all the seats at the general election in 2015, and are bipolar split into Eurosceptic and pro-European. In Hungary however, is the pro/anti-EU cleavage consolidated within the sphere of the left/right division and is not separated within political parties.

Comparing the Status Quo of the two member states to Romania, one can clearly reveal that Romania does not illustrate a profound manifestation of Euroscepticism in neither ideological nor political manner. The third chapter explores Euroscepticism as either reality or imminent dilemma, concluding can this be described as an imminent dilemma, as the political spectrum in Romania had no major uprising of extreme left/right-wing political identities since adhesion and even large scale European crisis did not have a deep-rooted impact on the perception of the EU domestically.

Vis-à-vis the research question can be summed up, that although there are potential triggers as exemplified with the antigovernment street protests and the endemic and systematic corruption, has no profound manifestation of the phenomenon on a large-scale basis been thus far detected in Romania. Furthermore, does the country remain since adhesion in 2007 one of the strongest Europhile adherents and has maintained high popularity towards the EU and has undergone substantial development via the financial and political assistance of the European Union. The absence of an increased Eurosceptic attitude in Romania is explanatory, especially in regards to the high cost/benefit ratio (utilitarian model), which in the case of Romania is exemplified by the macro-financial assistance offered by the EU and the dependence of the country to the external support granted by the EU institutions.

In a nutshell can be concluded that Eurosceptic tendencies have not affected the Romanian political landscape in the post-Brexit timeframe, potential triggers might represent a starting point for the phenomenon to establish itself in the long-term future. In this sense has the European Union to assume an even stronger attitude towards the country and continuously monitor and oppose the advancement of Eurosceptic ideas on a national level. Whereas the Romanian government needs to strengthen on a broader base the rule of law, democratic norms and anti-corruption reforms.

Bibliography

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